We argue for an intimate relation between semantic externalism and semantic deference and propose a typology of speakers’ metasemantic views as revealed by their deferential attitudes. Building on this typology, we then offer a classification of metasemantic disagreements understood as verbal disputes between speakers who (consciously or unconsciously) hold divergent metasemantic views about the same word. In particular, we distinguish lower-order metasemantic disagreements between speakers who disagree on the exact source of meaning determination for a word yet agree on the (...) kind of deferential attitude this word is liable to, from higher-order metasemantic disagreements between speakers who do not even agree on the suitable kind of deferential attitude. We demonstrate the fruitfulness of our classification through the concrete implications it has for conceptual engineering. (shrink)

As of Volume 9 (1994/95) John Benjamins Publishing Company is the official publisher of the Belgian Journal of Linguistics, the annual publication of the Linguistic Society of Belgium. Each volume is topical and includes selected papers from the international meetings organised by the LSB.

We sketch several variants of so-called “semantic externalism”, which we take to be prototypically embodied by Wittgenstein, Kripke and Burge respectively. Then, drawing inspiration from Putnam, we show how aspects of these different kinds of semantic externalism can be articulated with each other in the case of natural kind terms, and we suggest that this analysis could be extended to a larger set of words. When that is done, we turn to the core part of the paper, which consists in (...) a thorough discussion of the forms of “semantic deference” that can plausibly be associated with each brand of externalism. We suggest that the debates over the kinds of semantic externalism characteristic of different kinds of words can be clarified by investigating the kind of semantic deference they call for. (shrink)

Human communication is multi-modal. It is an empirical fact that many of our acts of communication exploit a variety of means to make our communicative intentions recognisable. Scholars readily distinguish between verbal and non-verbal means of communication, and very often they deal with them separately. So it is that a great number of semanticists and pragmaticists give verbal communication preferential treatment. The non-verbal aspects of an act of communication are treated as if they were not underlain by communicative intentions. They (...) are “relegated” to mere aspects of the context. However, several schools of thoughts have a different take on the issue. Thus psychologists or semioticians of gesture have shown how intricately gestures and speech are related in utterances. And, in a different area of the theoretical landscape, so-called “Relevance Theorists” have made the same point. Thus, Robyn Carston writes that “the domain of pragmatics is a natural class of environmental phenomena, that of ostensive stimuli; verbal utterances are the central case, but not the only one, and they themselves are frequently accompanied by other ostensive gestures of the face, hands, voice etc, all of which have to be interpreted together if one is to correctly infer what is being communicated”. This position rests on the assumption that there is a single “pragmatic system” or module at work in the interpretation of “ostensive stimuli”. When it comes to interpreting verbal stimuli, the same mechanisms and resources are used as when it comes to processing non-verbal ones. If there is no distinct “linguistic pragmatic system”, then the scholar who studies communication should not favour the verbal at the expense of the non-verbal. In this paper, I want to make a contribution to the study of multi-modal messages by considering a type of utterances that mix the verbal with the non-verbal in such a way that a piece of non-linguistic communication seems to stand in for a linguistic constituent which remains unrealised. Here is a real-life example : I didn't see the [IMITATION OF FRIGHTENING GRUMPINESS] woman today; will she be back this week? The square-bracketed string in small capitals is meant to capture the facial expressions and gestures performed in the conversational setting. What is intriguing here is that this instance of ostensive mimicry does not come as a mere complement to some linguistic stimulus; it appears to take the place of that stimulus. I shall try to show that a linguistic analysis can indeed be offered for cases like – though, I believe, without succumbing to the pro-linguistic bias that Carston warns against. I will, however, argue against an ellipsis-based account : the structure of sentence does not contain an unrealised adjective phrase. Instead, I shall defend a ‘syntactic-recruitment' account. (shrink)

We offer a new outlook on the vexed question of the reference of natural-kind terms. Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they designate their referents directly and they are rigid designators: their reference is unchanged even in worlds in which the referent lacks some or all the properties associated with it in the actual world, and which are useful to us in identifying that referent. There have, however, been heated (...) debates about what should be taken as a natural-kind term. Some challenge the very existence of a separate category of natural-kind terms ; some their being directly referential ; some raise the possibility that direct reference extends to terms beyond those usually assumed to fall under the category, e.g. to ‘polemical’ terms. When these debates turn on the question of what natural kinds are, they take on a strong epistemological or metaphysical dimension. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. This we define as speakers’ being disposed to use words in line with the norms of their linguistic community and as consenting to being corrected when it is manifest that their use and understanding of a word does not match common practice. When those dispositions are present, speakers defer semantically to something beyond themselves. Here, our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined. In other words, one can say that the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, participants are confronted with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements, e.g. An emu is a bird. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension, e.g. discoveries that require excluding certain species now thought to be birds from the Aves class. The scenario is such that it is clear that the ‘discoveries’ bring us closer to the actual essence, if there is one, of birds. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms – for instance summer, contract or rape – exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for bird. If so, then there’s a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond the usual set of terms. What would be shown in this way is that speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical. We are at the pre-test stage for the survey. We cannot yet report on our results. We should, however, have initial results by March, which, we believe, will enrich the observations made by previous empirical studies. References: Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Häggqvist, S. & Wikforss, Å. 2015. Experimental semantics: the case of natural kind terms, in J. Haukioja, Experimental Philosophy of Language, London, Bloomsbury./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2009. Against arguments from reference, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, 332-356./ Marconi, D. 1997. Language, Speech, and Communication. Lexical Competence. Cambridge : MIT Press./Moravcsik, J. 2016. Meaning, Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI./Schroeter, L. & Schroeter, F. 2014. Normative concepts: a connectedness model, Philosophers’ Imprint 14, 1-26./ Wikforss, Å. 2010. Are natural kind terms special?, in H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary, The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, New York, Routledge, 64-83. (shrink)

Are there “social kinds” the way there are “natural kinds”? Are social sciences likely to hit upon “essences” the way natural sciences do? Or are all social phenomena purely theoretical constructs? Questions about whether there are natural kinds, what exactly they are and which kinds of phenomena they cover have been the object of heated epistemological and metaphysical debates. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general (...) terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. Our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined; the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, which shows a kinship with work by Braisby et al., Jylkkä et al., and Genone & Lombrozo, we confront participants with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms, including terms for social phenomena, exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for natural-kind terms. If so, speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical, and there’s therefore a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond its usual boundaries. Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Schwarz, S. 1983. Reply to Kornblith and Nelson. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 21, 475-481. (shrink)

Most writers working on simultaneous use and mention assume a distinction between mixed quotation and scare quoting. The consensus is that MQ affects truth-conditions. Hence, many writers regard MQ as a semantic phenomenon. There is no such consensus about ScQ. On the face of it, there is a clear difference between: Alice said that life “is difficult to understand”. Several ‘groupies' followed the band on their tour. The words quoted in are attributed to Alice, and would seem false if Alice (...) had not uttered them. No such intuition is available for. This induces Cappelen & Lepore, leading writers in the field, to regard as a blend of Direct and Indirect Discourse and to propose the following semantic analysis : there is an utterance u such that Alice said u and u samesays “Life is difficult to understand” and u sametokens “is difficult to understand”. As for, they regard the impact of the quotation in it as being entirely pragmatic. I show, however, that there is no principled distinction between MQ and ScQ. The main points are: speech attribution to Alice in is defeasible; there are cases of simultaneous use and mention without “say” which are semantically relevant ; there is apparent MQ with reporting verbs that pose a problem because they cannot govern Direct Speech reports. Hence, it is illegitimate to appeal to the sametokening predicate in logical form. These examples that ‘refuse' to fall neatly under MQ or ScQ seal the fate of Cappelen & Lepore's account. To conclude, I discuss Benbaji's fully semantic theory. Benbaji adopts Cappelen & Lepore's views on MQ. But he also proposes a semantic account of ScQ. One option for him is to give up the Cappelen & Lepore story and extend his views on ScQ to all instances of simultaneous use and mention. I show, however, that this too fails. Therefore, in the end, only a pragmatic account of simultaneous use and mention remains as a viable option. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to clarify the distinctions and the relationships among several phenomena, each of which has certain characteristics of what is generally called “deference”. We distinguish linguistic deference, which concerns the use of language and the meaning of the words we use, from epistemic deference, which concerns our reasons and evidence for making the claims we make. In our in-depth study of linguistic deference, we distinguish two subcategories: default deference, and deliberate deference. We also discuss the (...) phenomenon of im-perfect mastery, often associated with deference, and which we show to be independent both of linguistic deference and of epistemic deference. If our analysis is correct, then some recent debates on deference can be shown to result from a failure to appreciate all the distinctions that we draw here. (shrink)

This paper deals with the reference of quotations. Several positions can be discerned in the literature: 1. Quotations do not refer; 2. Quotations only refer to types or classes; 3. Quotations can refer to a variety of objects. Although I believe the third position to be the most sensible one, I show that it cannot be taken for granted and that arguments proving it to be correct are hard to come by.

This book, "Utterance Interpretation and Cognitive Models", is a collection of papers that stems from the conference of the same name held at the Free University of Brussels in June 2006. Our main objective is to reconcile armchair theorising about the semantics-pragmatics interface with hypotheses about cognitive architecture. For that reason, the papers in the collection place some of the hottest questions in contemporary philosophy of language within the scope of a psychologically plausible theory of human communication. The collection is (...) articulated into three parts. The first concerns the cognitive counterparts of lexical meanings. The second explores the links between moods and forces. The third looks at the epistemological status of semantic theory from the point of view of human psychology. (shrink)

This is the pdf of a talk we gave at the Linguistics & Epistemology conference at Aberdeen University, on May 13, 2007.

Over the last decade, research in semantics and pragmatics has started to increasingly incorporate new experimental methods from cognitive psychology. That this empirical stance on utterance interpretation has now reached maturity is revealed by two unmistakable symptoms: an increased reflection on the contextual methods used to elicit experimental data, and a continuous expansion of the linguistic phenomena and themes being investigated through these methods. The articles gathered in this volume testify to this very recent evolution of the field: a first (...) set of papers questions the interpretation or interpretability of data collected in non-naturalistic settings, while a second set reflects the extension of experimental methods to new topics. The volume offers an up-to-date overview of contemporary issues arising within the thriving field of Empirical Pragmatics. (shrink)

Response to two papers by Philippe De Brabanter in the symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).

A l'instar de ses confrères des années 1250-1260 à l'Université de Paris, Siger de Brabant prit activement part à un mouvement de prise de conscience et de revendication intellectuelle, d'émancipation de la raison contre l'autorité du dogme et le dogmatisme en général, et joua un rôle essentiel dans l'émergence d'un nouveau style, d'une nouvelle morale, d'une nouvelle forme d'existence : en un mot, à la vie philosophique. Il proposa une nouvelle éthique, établie à partir de la lecture d'Aristote, mais une (...) lecture essentiellement rationaliste qui, aux yeux des autorités, s'écartait en tous points de la sagesse chrétienne - affirmant notamment que c'est en cette vie que l'on peut trouver le. bonheur, et non dans l'autre. Siger de Brabant contribua ainsi à une renaissance de la philosophie, qui commence par la Logique qui ordonne la pensée et le discours du philosophe, lui donne aussi son style, au sens littéraire du terme - ce dont le Traité de l'éternité du monde est une bonne illustration. (shrink)

La Universidad de París en la Europa de finales del siglo XIII fue centro de acaloradas discusiones acerca del alma del hombre. La cuestión del alma es el punto doctrinal central y se muestra decisivo porque en la resolución de este único punto puede verse el trasfondo antropológico y metafísico de toda una cosmovisión filosófica e incluso teológica del universo. Una de las más problemáticas cuestiones que se plantearon acerca del alma es el problema de la unidad del intelecto para (...) todos los hombres. Parecería contradictorio pensar que todos los hombres piensan con un único intelecto, pero a su vez suena absurdo afirmar que un principio espiritual, inmaterial, se una a un cuerpo por un tiempo determinado para luego separarse. Ambas posiciones surgen de la consideración de nuevos textos llegados a las manos de los pensadores parisinos a través de autores árabes: los textos del De anima de Aristóteles. (shrink)

To select as the subject of a study of limited size a topic as fundamental and, additionally, one so long discussed as has been the case with literary practice greatly risks—and we are fully aware of this—appearing to be an undertaking which is both presumptuous (how many studies, sometimes major ones, have been devoted to this question during recent decades?) and doomed to failure (is it serious to presume, in a few pages, to deal, even partially, with so vast and (...) so complex a subject?). However, one precise reason causes us to think that it is time, today, to re-examine this ancient problem in new terms. The field of French literary research is at present characterized by a major institutional and ideological fact, the massive reality of which certain particular or collective efforts, no matter how remarkable these might be, cannot cover over. An airtight seal continues to separate, globally, traditional literary research from recent studies produced by certain linguists and speech historians in the domain of linguistic practices. Whence this scientifically paradoxical consequence: studies dealing with fundamentally similar objects—discursive practices—are presently being conducted in parallel, on the basis of theoretical premises which are radically opposed in most cases, with each one almost absolutely ignorant of the others. This situation, we believe, is exceedingly harmful to literary research. By making all interdisciplinary relation impossible as well as inhibiting certain questioning necessary within the realm of this research, it contributes to blocking progress in large measure. Need we point out that we nourish no naive hopes of overturning within the space of a few pages a situation whose roots, both institutional and ideological, are so deep? Nor does one distinguish oneself more by providing definitive answers for these basic problems which we propose discussing here, answers which one might even believe possible to guarantee as fully correct. We would only like to attempt to prove, by re-examining in new terms some fundamental problems of literary theory, the advantage which this theory might be able to find in certain data drawn from linguistics and the “analysis of discourse”, and inversely to propose certain theoretical readjustments which a specific reflection on literary practice seems to make necessary in the field of these two disciplines, particularly in that of the second. The pages which follow should, therefore, only be taken for what they are: an attempt, limited in its scope and problematic in its conclusions, to break down some barriers and to open a breach at certain critical points. (shrink)

Héritier de l'humanisme de la Renaissance et précurseur du siècle des Lumières, Pierre Bayle est un des penseurs les plus originaux de l'âge classique. Protestant exilé aux Pays-Bas, il est devenu un apôtre de la liberté de conscience, et son activité de philosophe, de journaliste et de savant ainsi que sa vaste correspondance lui ont donné un rôle-clé dans l'évolution de la culture européenne. Conjuguant les approches historique, littéraire et philosophique, les auteurs de ce volume réexaminent la vie et le (...) discours de Bayle, les thèmes de son oeuvre et les modalités de leur diffusion. En mettant l'accent sur les informations fournies par la correspondance et sur le rôle de Bayle dans les débats éthiques et métaphysiques de l'époque, ils étudient: l'activité épistolaire, élément historique déterminant mais aussi métaphore d'un penseur toujours en mouvement; la réflexion philosophique et politique sur la tolérance, la liberté, la justice, la vertu - enjeux actuels, notamment dans le domaine de la laïcité; les tensions irréductibles présentes dans le discours baylien sur la raison et la foi, qui refuse toute simplification. Une riche bibliographie qui répertorie plus de 950 titres parus entre 1900 et 2010 complète ce volume, et donne un aperçu de ces champs de recherche en pleine évolution. La pensée de Bayle a rayonné sur l'Europe classique en contribuant à sa 'crise de conscience'; nous en redécouvrons l'étonnante modernité. (shrink)

L’auteur interroge le rapport de Lacan aux philosophes du passé et de son temps. Dans ce dialogue avec eux aussi bien que contre, quelle est la position originale de Lacan? Le terme de folisophie est un witz proposé pour en rendre compte.

« Les choses qu’on peut enseigné ne valent pas la peine d’être apprises ».Paul Claudel Invité dans ce séminaire de philosophie à parler de l’affectivité, je souhaite commencer par préciser de quel lieu je parle. Ce lieu est celui de la psychanalyse. Les références qui seront les miennes sont donc l’expérience personnelle des cures dites analytiques, d’une part, et d’autre part la doctrine freudienne, lue, interprétée, éclairée par Lacan. C’est donc sous le signe de cette praxis que j’abordera...

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Avertissement Les paradoxes logiques Première partie - Signification et dénotation Les expressions simplement significatives et une catégorie d'expressions dénotatives : les descriptions définies Autres catégories d'expressions dénotatives L'élimination des expressions dénotatives Seconde partie - (...) Prédicativité et universalité Le principe du cercle vicieux La théorie substitutionnelle La théorie des types Unecertaine idée de la logique Références bibliographiques Pages de fin. (shrink)

We introduce non-associative linear logic, which may be seen as the classical version of the non-associative Lambek calculus. We define its sequent calculus, its theory of proof-nets, for which we give a correctness criterion and a sequentialization theorem, and we show proof search in it is polynomial.